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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we examine whether and to what extent the surge in the foreign direct 
investment (FDI) into China in recent years has come at the expense of FDI inflows 
into European Union (EU) countries. 
China has recently become a leading destination for FDI. In a recent survey on FDI 
prospects, transnational companies rank China as the most attractive global business 
location  (UNCTAD, 2005). In 2003, China has overtaken the US as the number one 
destination for FDI (Prasad and Wei, 2005). 
The FDI inward stock in China has increased dramatically since early 1990s, from 
20.7 billion US dollars in 1990 to 292.6 billion US dollars in 2006. While the annual 
average of FDI inward flows over the period 1990-2000 was 30.1 billion US dollars, 
FDI inward flows into China in recent years have been much higher, 72.4 billion US 
dollars in 2005 and 69.5 billion US dollars in 20061. This surge in FDI in China has 
followed the opening of the economy to the world economy, the selective easing of 
capital controls and an available pool of labour (Prasad and Wei, 2005).  
The success of China in attracting FDI has raised concerns that this has come at the 
expense of other countries and regions. This paper aims to bring empirical evidence to 
answer this concern. In particular the focus of this paper is on the impact of FDI to 
China on FDI into EU countries.  Has the surge in the FDI into China in recent years 
come at the expense of FDI inflows into EU countries? Has this impact changed over 
time? Are spillover effects from FDI to China different for horizontal and vertical 
FDI?   
To our knowledge, this is the first analysis of the effects of FDI into China on the FDI 
inflows into EU countries. Previous analyses have focused on the effects of FDI into 
China in developing countries, in particular the Asian countries and the Latin America 
and Caribbean (LAC) countries (Eichengreen and Tong, 2006a, 2006b; Cravino, 
Lederman and Olarreaga, 2007).  
 We estimate the effects of FDI inflows into China originating from OECD countries 
on FDI inflows into EU countries and other countries by using a panel of cross-
country annual observations over the period 1990-2004. We have data for 35 host 
                                                 
1 UNCTAD (2007) 
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countries, including the EU member states before the enlargement of 2004 (EU15), 
and the ten new EU countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)2. In addition, we 
identify spillover effects to horizontal and vertical FDI. In comparison with existing 
studies, we employ improved econometric techniques to control for unobserved 
country heterogeneity and simultaneity effects.  
Our results suggest that on average, ceteris paribus, FDI inflows into China have been 
complementary with FDI inflows into other countries. However, while the effect on 
FDI into EU15 has been positive, it appears that FDI inflows into China have 
crowded out the FDI inflows to CEE countries. In particular, small economies such as 
Bulgaria, the Baltic countries and Malta have been affected negatively by the surge in 
the FDI into China. This FDI diversion appears in the case of efficiency-seeking 
(vertical) FDI.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
theoretical and empirical background for our analysis. Section 3 explains our 
empirical strategy and the model specifications. In section 4 we describe the data set 
that we use. The results of our empirical analysis are presented and discussed in 
Section 5. Finally we summarize our findings and conclude in Section 6.      
 
                                                 
2 EU15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom; CEE countries: Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia; The other host 
countries are: Brazil, China, Cyprus, India, Japan, Malta, Mexico, the Russian Federation, Switzerland 
and the United States.   
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2. Theoretical and Empirical Background  
 
The theoretical framework of our analysis is the theory of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) which has been formalized in several seminal papers by Markusen (1984), 
Helpman (1984), Markusen and Venables (1997, 1998). The theoretical models of 
MNEs explain the volume of production of MNEs as a function of the characteristics 
of the home and host countries such as size, relative endowments, and transaction 
costs.  
The theoretical literature distinguishes between foreign direct investment driven by 
“horizontal” and “vertical” motivations.  Horizontal MNEs or market-seeking FDI 
produce the same goods and services in multiple locations. Models of horizontal 
MNEs (Markusen, 1984; Horstmann and Markusen, 1987, 1992; and Markusen and 
Venables, 1998, 2000) predict that MNEs production will concentrate in large 
countries and in countries with similar relative endowments.  
Vertical MNEs, or “efficiency-seeking FDI”, imply the geographic fragmentation of 
production into stages. Models of vertical MNEs (Helpman, 1984; and Helpman and 
Krugman, 1985) predict that MNEs production will locate in relatively labour 
abundant countries.  
Existing empirical studies have used a standard gravity model applied to FDI to 
explain bilateral FDI flows (Brenton, and al., 1999; Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004; 
Brainard, 1997, Ekholm, 1995, 1997, 1998; Stein and Duade, 2007). They find 
empirical evidence showing that: 
i) FDI is concentrated among countries relatively similar in size and in 
relative endowments  
ii) Capital abundant countries conduct more outward FDI and receive less 
FDI 
iii) Labour-abundant countries receive more FDI and conduct less outward 
FDI  
Several empirical studies focus on the quality of institutions to explain bilateral FDI 
flows (Wei, 1997, 2000; Duade and Stein, 2001; Globerman and Shapiro, 2002; 
Habib and Zurawicki, 2002; Benassy-Quere et al, 2007). Good quality institutions in 
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the home and host countries have a positive effect on bilateral FDI flows via 
productivity growth and reduced uncertainty.  
 The impact of FDI inflows into China on FDI inflows in other countries has been 
examined in a number of recent papers. Eichengreen and Tong (2006a, 2006b) find 
that the emergence of China as a leading FDI destination has encouraged FDI flows to 
other Asian countries via supply chain production linkages. They also find evidence 
suggesting that FDI inflows into China have substituted FDI inflows into European 
countries. They explain this diversion effect by the negative effect of distance on 
supply-chain production linkages. In contrast, Mercereau (2005) shows that on 
average, the FDI into China has had a negative effect on FDI into other Asian 
countries. However, his estimates of country-specific effects indicate that the 
diversion effect is driven by two countries, namely Singapore and Myanmar. It 
appears that the FDI inflows into China have not affected the other Asian countries. 
Cravino, Lederman and Olarreaga (2007) examine the effect of foreign capital stock 
in China on the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries and they find no 
evidence for a FDI diversion from OECD countries, in particular from the US to 
China at the expense of the LAC countries.  While the growth of capital stocks in 
China originating from the OECD especially from the US was faster than in LAC 
countries over the period 1990-1997 this relative growth has slowed down since 1997.   
To our knowledge our contribution is the first analysis of the effects of the FDI 
inflows into China originating from OECD countries on the FDI inflows into 
European Union countries. In particular we identify the average effect on the EU15-
the member countries prior the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements and the EU10-
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, we distinguish spillover effects 
to horizontal and vertical FDI.   
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3. Empirical Methodology  
 
We first estimate the following baseline gravity model to identify determinants of 
bilateral FDI flows:  
 
  
All regressors are lagged by one year to account for the fact that the implementation 
of investment decisions is in practice lagged3. Further, lagging the regressors avoids  
potential endogeneity arising from the effect of FDI on some of the explanatory 
variables.  
The above model estimates the real FDI flows from country i to country j at time t+1 
as a function of the following explanatory variables:  
- market potential (MPijt): the sum of the GDP at time t in the home (GDPit) and 
host country (GDPjt) over the distance between the home and host country 
(DISTij); this variable is a proxy for horizontal (market-seeking) FDI 
incentive; 
- relative endowments (capital/labour ratio): the absolute difference at time t of 
the GDP per capita in the home (GDPCAPit) and host country (GDPCAPjt); 
this variable is a proxy for vertical (efficiency-seeking) FDI incentive; 
- the quality of institutions at time t in the host country (INSTjt); 
- home and host country fixed effects ),( ji βα  
- time specific effects )( tτ  
ijtε  is the error term. 
 
Recent literature on FDI and growth (Borensztein et al., 1998; Rodriguez-Clare, 1996 
and Zhang, 2001) suggests that FDI and GDP might be simultaneously determined 
and this could bias the estimates. However, this literature usually considers aggregate 
FDI inflows and not bilateral flows, as we do in this paper. As shown  Baier and 
                                                 
3 See also Mercereau (2005)  
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Bergstrand (2007) potential endogeneity of bilateral FDI flows and in GDP is 
negligible.   
To estimate the effect of FDI flows into China to FDI flows in other countries we 
include in the above model a measure of FDI flows into China at time t from each 
home country (FDICNit). Unobserved global shocks can affect both the attractiveness 
of FDI to China and other countries. To correct for this potential endogeneity we 
instrument FDICNit with the market potential between the home country i and China 
(the sum of GDP in the origin country and the GDP in China at time t over the 
distance between the home country i and China), and the absolute difference in the 
GDP per capita in the home country i and the GDP per capita in China at time t.      
We estimate the following system of simultaneous equations:     
  
 
The coefficient of interest is b4 in the primary equation:  b4>0 suggests that the FDI 
flows to China and FDI flows to other countries originating from the OECD countries 
were complementary; b4<0 suggests that the FDI flows to China and FDI flows to 
other countries were substitutes.    
We estimate first the average effects of FDI flows into China on FDI flows into other 
countries and next we allow the coefficient for FDI flows into China to be different 
for EU15, CEE and the rest of the countries. In addition we allow the coefficient of 
FDI into China to vary over time.  
To identify spillover effects from horizontal and vertical FDI into China on other 
countries we include in the previous model two interacted terms4: we interact the 
                                                 
4 These  interacted terms have been suggested in previous studies on bilateral FDI flows, for example  
Markusen and Maskus (2002). Eichengreen and Tong (2006a) use this approach to identify spillover 
effects from FDI into China on horizontal and vertical FDI into other countries. 
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instrumented FDI into China with our proxy for market size, the market potential of 
home and host countries, MPijt (horizontal FDI incentive); also, we interact the 
instrumented FDI into China with a proxy for relative labour costs, the absolute 
difference in the GDP per capita in the home and host countries (vertical FDI 
incentive). The coefficients of these interacted terms capture whether and to what 
extent the attractiveness of China for horizontal (vertical) FDI might discourage 
horizontal (vertical) FDI in other host countries.  
We first estimate the average spillover effects and subsequently we allow the 
coefficients of the interacted terms to be different for EU15, CEE and the other host 
countries.  The estimated model is the following system of simultaneous equations: 
 
ijttjijtititijtit
itjtjtitijtijt
GDPCAPGDPCAPFDICNdMPFDICNd
FDICNdINSTdGDPCAPGDPCAPdMPddFDI
ξλνµ ++++−++
+++−++=
lnln*lnln*ln
lnlnlnln)ln(
65
43210
 
ittcnittCNiit GDPCAPGDPCAPeMPeeFDICN ψ+−++= ,2,,10 lnln  
 
4. The Data  
 
The data on FDI that we use in this paper is from the OECD International Direct 
Investment Statistics Yearbook, published by OECD (2004). OECD defines FDI as an 
international investment by a firm in one country (the home country) with the 
objective of establishing a long lasting interest in an enterprise located in another 
country (the host country) different from that of the investing firm.  
Direct investment involves either the initial transaction between the two firms or all 
subsequent capital transactions between them. Given our specific focus on the 
dynamics of the impact of FDI into China on the FDI into other countries, we use  
annual bilateral outward FDI  flows rather than stocks. We have data for bilateral FDI 
flows originating in 23 OECD countries disaggregated on 35 OECD and non-OECD 
host countries, over the period 1990 to 2004.5  As pointed out in the literature, FDI 
                                                 
5 Source countries are Austria, Belgium, Czech R., Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak R., Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. The recipient countries include, besides 
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stocks are indeed less volatile than flows since the re-direction of FDI from one 
country to another requires a significant amount of time.  
The original FDI data were obtained in current US dollars. We deflate these data by 
using the US price deflator for investment (2000=100) taken from the AMECO data 
base of the European Commission. Real GDP, and GDP per capita in constant 2000 
US dollar are obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators data base. The 
distance between the home and host countries (DISTij)  is measured as the great circle 
distance between the capital cities in the home and host countries. The source for 
these data is the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales 
(CEPII). Our proxy for the quality of institutions (INST) is the mean of three 
indicators measuring the quality of institutions, namely: “corruption”, “law and 
order”, and “bureaucracy quality”. The index takes values from 0 (the lowest quality) 
to 1 (the highest quality). The data source is the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG).  Further details about the data and variable description are given in Table A1 
in the Appendix.   
Following conventional practice used in the gravity model literature, we add one to 
FDI flows before transforming them in log, in order to avoid the problems with zero 
observations.6   
                                                                                                                                            
the 23 OECD countries just mentioned, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, India, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Romania, Russia Federation, and Slovenia, too.  
6 Nearly 11 per cent of our observations have a zero value for bilateral flows of FDI and 15 per cent 
record a divesture from the host countries. After the transformation, we restricted the sample to include 
only observations with strictly positive values for our dependent variables. Alternatively, we might 
have considered zero flows as missing values and directly dropped them from the sample. We use both 
strategy and found minimal differences in the estimated coefficients. Results are available upon 
request.  
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5. Estimation Results 
Determinants of bilateral FDI flows and the impact of FDI into China on FDI into 
other countries 
The estimates of bilateral FDI flows obtained with our baseline model are shown in 
column (1) of Table 1.  
Table 1:  Bilateral FDI flows and the impact of FDI into China  
on FDI into other countries  
 
 Bilateral FDI flows 
(OLS) 
The impact of FDI to 
China on FDI to other 
countries   
The impact of FDI to 
China on FDI to EU 
countries   
Ln MPijt 0.442***  (0.042) 0.430*** (0.044) 0.425*** (0.052) 
Abs diff GDP per 
capita i,j 
-0.294*** (0.024) -0.260*** (0.027) -0.093*** (0.031) 
INSTjt 0.206***  (0.457) 0.054         (0.480) 0.430        (0.470) 
Ln FDICNit  0.587***   (0.032) 0.359***  (0.062) 
Ln FDICNit*EU15   -0.105*** (0.032) 
Ln FDICNit*CEE   -0.475*** (0.039) 
EU15   0.133        (0.504) 
CEE   -4.475      (0.463) 
Home country fixed 
effects 
F(21, 4730) = 144.99 
Prob>F = 0.000 
χ2(18) = 740.34 
Prob> χ2 = 0.000 
F(20, 4124) = 8.09 
Prob>F = 0.000 
Host country fixed 
effects 
F(32,4730)=55.14  
Prob>F   0.000 
χ2(32)=1703.84  
Prob> χ2   0.000 
F(31,4124)=6.20  
Prob>F   0.000 
Time specific fixed 
effects 
F(13,4730) = 33.20 
Prob >F = 0.000 
χ2 (12) = 133.26 
Prob > χ2 = 0.000 
F(13,4124) = 7.98 
Prob >F = 0.000 
Hansen  J test 
H0= all instr. valid 
 0.041 
Prob > χ2 =0.839 
 
Obs. 4802 4197 4197 
R2 0.7031 0.6910 0.7141 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively  
 
The estimates for determinants of bilateral FDI flows are consistent with theory 
predictions and other empirical studies discussed in Section 2. On average, ceteris 
paribus, bilateral FDI flows are positively related to economic size, similarity of 
relative endowments and the quality of institutions in the host countries. As suggested 
by the literature on multinational enterprise activity, FDI tends to take place among 
countries similar in size and relative endowments. Large countries generate and 
receive larger flows of FDI relative to small countries. The larger the capital/labour 
ratio differential is between the home and host countries the lower the bilateral FDI 
flows are. This result again reflects the characteristics of the countries included in our 
data set, in particular the similarity in relative endowments for the majority of these 
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countries. Furthermore, labour cost differentials captured by the absolute difference in 
GDP per capita may not be important for FDI attraction, which, instead, is driven by 
the quality of the institutions of the host countries.7  
We turn next to the estimates of the effect of FDI inflows into China to other 
countries which are shown in column (2) of Table 1. These estimates are obtained 
with an augmented gravity model in which we added the log of FDI flows from our 
23 OECD home countries into China. As discussed above, we instrument FDI inflows 
to China to account for potential correlation of FDI inflows to China and the error 
term due to unobserved factors that may increase simultaneously the attractiveness of 
China and other countries as FDI destinations.  
The results of the first stage regression of FDI inflows into China are shown in Table 
A2 in the Appendix. The estimated model explains 93 percent of the variation of the 
FDI inflows into China originating in OECD countries. Thus these estimates indicate 
that the capital/labour ratio differential (labour cost differential) between home 
countries and China were positively associated with the FDI inflows into China 
originating from OECD countries.8 This is in line with the prediction of the vertical 
MNEs models and the assumed geographic fragmentation of production into stages . 
Market potential for China-home country pairs is negatively associated with FDI into 
China9.   
 The significance and magnitude of the coefficients of bilateral FDI flows are similar 
to those obtained with our baseline regression. The coefficient of the variable of 
interest in this model which measures the effect of FDI inflows into China on other 
countries is positive and significantly different from zero at the one percent 
significance level. This result suggests that on average, ceteris paribus, FDI inflows 
into China originating from OECD countries were complementary to FDI inflows 
originating from OECD into other destinations.  
                                                 
7 The negative sign of this variable may also be due to the fact that differences in wage levels are not 
compensated by productivity. See Globerman and Shapiro (2002) for a discussion on this issue.  
8 Note that the first stage regression includes also the other exogenous variables from the second stage 
regression, as requested by standard econometric methodology.     
9 The negative relationship between market potential for China-home country pairs and FDI into China 
might be due to spurious correlation between the market potential variable and home country dummies. 
Since the host country, China, is the same for FDI originating in all home countries, market potential 
for each China-home country pair is positively related to GDP in the home country. The smaller the 
home country, the lower FDI outflows  to China originating in these countries are likely to be. 
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The main objective of this paper is to examine whether and to what extent the FDI 
inflows into China have affected the FDI inflows into the European Union countries. 
To this purpose, we re-estimate the previous model specification and allow the 
coefficient of the fitted value of Chinese FDI to vary across countries. We distinguish 
between EU15 and the new EU countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).   The 
estimates are shown in column (3) of Table 1. These results suggest that the setting up 
of production plants in China has discouraged additional investment in the new EU 
member state of Central and Eastern Europe. FDI into China appear complementary 
to FDI inflows into EU15 countries and into the other host countries10.  
This result suggests that the advantage of the CEE countries due to their proximity to 
FDI source countries is not sufficient to offset the attractiveness of China as a FDI 
destination.  
The effect of FDI inflows on FDI into other countries in particular the EU countries 
may have varied over the analysed period due to adaptation of foreign investors to 
changes either in China’s investment climate or in CEE countries. To account for this  
potential time specific effects, we estimate our augmented gravity model  separately 
for three periods: 1990-1994, 1995-1999, and 2000-2004.  
This strategy allows us to uncover interesting results which are shown in Table 2.  
Our results indicate that while FDI into China have been complementary with FDI 
into EU15 countries, the diversion effect of FDI into China on FDI into CEE 
countries has been persistent over the whole period and it has intensified since 2000. 
The impact of FDI inflows into China on the rest of the host countries has been 
positive in each of the three sub-periods and significantly different from zero.  
                                                 
10 The interpretation of the estimated coefficients in  column (3) of Table 1 is as follows: The 
coefficients of Ln FDICNit  interacted with the EU15 and the CEE dummies indicate how much the 
slope coefficient of the average diversion, that is, the coefficient of Ln FDICNit, differs from the slope 
coefficient of the FDI flows into the EU15 countries and the CEE, respectively. The slope coefficient 
of the FDI effect for EU15 is 0.359-0.105= 0.254 and the effect on FDI into CEE countries is 0.359-
0.475 = -0.116.  
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Table 2: The impact of FDI to China on other countries over time  
 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 
 
Ln MPijt 
 
0.546*** (0.110) 
 
0.532*** (0.087) 
 
0.461*** (0.101) 
Abs diff GDP per capita 
i,j 
 
0.205*** (0.76) 
 
-0.084*  (0.049) 
 
-0.125** (0.060) 
 
INSTjt 
 
2.462*     (1.311) 
 
0.010 (1.160) 
 
1.274  (1.298) 
 
Ln FDICNit 
 
 0.442*** (0.135)  
 
0.251**  (0.110) 
 
0.345**   (0.162) 
 
Ln FDICNit*EU15 
 
-0.341*** (0.077) 
 
-0.139** (0.056) 
 
-0.066       (0.049) 
 
Ln FDICNit*CEE 
 
-0.571***   (0.102) 
 
-0.354*** (0.067) 
 
-0.484*** (0.057) 
EU15 2.057***   (0.709) -2.088*** (0.699) 0.887 (0.708) 
CEE 3.861***   (0.728) -0.131 (0.529) 2.568***(0.633) 
Home country fixed 
effects 
F(14, 765) = 6.82 
Prob>F = 0.000 
F (16, 1400) = 6.69 
Prob> F2 = 0.000 
F(20, 1482) = 3.51 
Prob>F = 0.000 
Host country fixed 
effects 
F(27,765)=7.49  
Prob>F   0.000 
F (27, 1400)=3.98  
Prob> F   0.000 
F(31,1482)=3.35  
Prob>F   0.000 
Time specific fixed 
effects 
F(3,765) = 1.17 
Prob >F = 0.3197 
F (4,1400) =6.48 
Prob > F = 0.000 
F(3,1482) = 1.44 
Prob >F = 0.229 
 
Obs. 
 
818 
 
1456 
 
1545 
 
R2 
 
0.7620 
 
0.7494 
 
0.7249 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively  
 
Spillover effects from FDI into China on horizontal and vertical FDI  
We turn now to the role played by horizontal and vertical motivations for FDI in 
driving the previous results.   
According to the theory, horizontal FDI usually involves the replication of the 
production facilities in the host countries. Given the fact that their main purpose is to 
serve local markets, the market potential is one of the main drivers for this type of 
FDI. Vertical FDI, instead, implies the fragmentation of the vertical chain of 
production and the relocation of production stages in low cost locations stimulated by 
international differences in input prices.  
To distinguish between vertical and horizontal FDI in our modelling framework, we 
add to the previous model specification two interacted terms: the fitted FDI inflows 
into China variable interacted with our proxy for market potential (the sum of GDP of 
the host and the home countries weighted by the distance between them), and a 
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second interaction of the fitted FDI inflows into China variable with our proxy for 
labour cost differentials (the absolute difference of GDP per capita in the source and 
in host countries). The first interacted variable captures the effect of FDI into China 
on horizontal FDI, while the latter captures the spillover effect on vertical FDI.  
Estimates of this latter model are shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Spillover effects from FDI into China to horizontal and vertical FDI   
 
 Spillover effects to all 
countries  
Spillover effects to EU 
countries  
Ln MPijt 0.227***   (0.063) 0.348***     (0.068) 
Abs diff GDP per capita 
i,j 
-0.549*** (0.050) -0.382***    (0.048) 
INSTjt 0.356        (0.472)  0.391           (0.465) 
Ln FDICNit -1.618*** (0.228) -1.126***      (0.243) 
FDICN*HOR  0.052***   (0.009)  0.065***       (0.011) 
FDICN*VER  0.088***  (0.008) 0.019*           (0.011) 
FDICN*HOR*EU15  -0.033***     (0.005) 
FDICN*VER*EU15  0.065***      (0.011) 
FDICN*HOR*CEE  -0.020          (0.014) 
FDICN*VER*CEE  0.003           (0.031) 
EU15  -1.330*** (0.385) 
CEE  -2.212*** (0.401) 
Home country fixed 
effects 
F(20,4124)=9.28 
Prob>F=0.099 
F(20,4120)=10.24 
Prob>F=0.000 
Host country fixed 
effects 
F(32,4124)=5.35 
Prob>F=0.000 
F(31,4120)=6.78 
Prob>F=0.000 
Time specific fixed 
effects 
F(13,4124)=7.80 
Prob>F=0.000 
F(13,4120)=7.81 
Prob>F=0.000 
Obs. 4197 4197 
R2 0.7124 0.7218 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively  
Given the introduction of the two interacted terms into the model specification, the 
impact of FDI into China on other host countries is no longer constant, This implies 
that regression coefficients reflect conditional relationships, as indicated by the 
implied derivative:  
 
| -|*088.0*052.0618.1- jtitijt
it
ijt GDPCAPGDPCAPMP
FDICN
FDI
++=
δ
δ
  
   
The direct effect of FDI into China is negative and significant at the one percent level, 
as it is shown in column (1) of Table 3. Therefore, the derivative is expected to be 
negative when the market potential is very small and GDP per capita are similar. This 
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implies that only FDI flows directed towards less attractive host countries in terms of 
either market potential or factor cost advantages should be negatively affected by FDI 
inflows into China. This negative effect, however, weakens as host countries increases 
their advantages, either in terms of market potential or differences in development 
levels with the source countries, as indicated by the coefficients of either market 
potential or GDP per capita difference which are both positive and significant at the 
conventional levels. Therefore, having a large domestic market and/or factor cost 
advantages may help in developing complementarities with FDI flows to China.  
Figure 1 shows the derivative discussed above. In particular, it plots the marginal 
effect of FDI to China on the vertical axis and GDP per capita differences on the 
horizontal axis in panel a). In panel b) we replace GDP per capita with market 
potential. In order to show how both the explanatory variables are able to condition 
the marginal effect of FDI to China on the same figure, we fixed the market potential 
and GDP per capita differences at their mean level and one standard deviation below 
and above the mean, respectively.  
Three facts are worth noticing in panel a). First of all, the marginal effect is negative 
and statistically significant when host and home countries’ GDPs per capita are very 
similar and this is true also for host countries with very high values of market 
potential. This suggests that FDI inflows into China are substitutes for FDI into 
countries which are less attractive for vertical FDI. Secondly, very high values for 
market potential help in compensating the lack of cost advantages. When market 
potential is one standard deviation above the mean, the marginal effect of FDI into 
China becomes positive for lower values of GDP per capita difference than countries 
with market potential below the mean. Thirdly, as factor cost advantages become 
really important, the marginal effect of FDI into China turns out to be positive and 
significant even for countries whose market potential is below the sample mean. This 
fact is more apparent in Figure 1 panel b).  
Overall, these results suggest that host countries attracting mainly horizontal FDI 
adjust to the competitive pressure exerted by China better than countries attracting 
vertical FDI. The latter, in fact, benefit from FDI into China only when GDP per 
capita differs substantially from that of source countries. These results indicate that 
FDI into China are predominantly efficiency-seeking rather than market-seeking, 
despite the large market size of China.    
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Figure 1. The marginal effect of FDI into China on other host countries 
 
a) all values of GDP per capita differences     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) all values of market potential 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The effects of FDI into China on FDI into EU countries are very similar to those in 
the case of the other host countries including in our sample. The main differences are 
in the case of EU15, where FDI into China appear to foster to a larger extent vertical 
FDI in comparison to horizontal FDI, as indicated by the magnitude and the sign of 
the coefficients of the interacted terms. The effect of FDI into China on FDI into CEE 
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countries is not statistically different from those of other host countries. These results 
suggest that FDI into China are likely to divert FDI flows from countries with small 
domestic markets, unless they can compensate this disadvantage with very large GDP 
per capita differentials.  
Country-specific spillover effects from FDI into China are discussed in the next 
section.  
Table 4: Time specific spillover effects from FDI into China on horizontal  
   and vertical FDI  
 
 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2005 
 
Ln FDICNit 
 
-0.337   (0.776) 
 
-1.123***   (0.425) 
 
-1.109***  (0.395) 
 
FDICN*HOR 
 
0.031       (0.030) 
 
0.058***     (0.019) 
 
0.068***    (0.017) 
 
FDICN*VER 
  
0.013        (0.051) 
 
0.021            (0.021) 
 
0.009          (0.016) 
 
FDICN*HOR*EU15 
 
-0.024     (0.015) 
 
-0.039***  (0.008) 
 
-0.029***   (0.007) 
 
FDICN*VER*EU15 
 
 0.024       (0.034) 
 
0.080***  ( 0.020) 
 
0.057***      (0.017) 
 
FDICN*HOR*CEE 
 
0.056       (0.041) 
 
-0.013        (0.023) 
 
-0.027           (0.023) 
 
FDICN*VER*CEE 
 
-0.172*   (0.089) 
 
-0.000        (0.049) 
 
0.015         (0.047) 
EU15 -1.703*   (0.923) -1.874***  (0.658) 1.355* (0.716) 
CEE 0.289      (0.827) -2.455***  (0.643) 2.413***(0.564) 
Home country fixed 
effects 
F(14,761)=6.59 
Prob>F=0.000 
F(16,1396)=8.10 
Prob>F=0.000 
F(20,1478)=4.25 
Prob>F=0.099 
Host country fixed 
effects 
F(27,761)=7.43 
Prob>F=0.000 
F(27,1396)=4.85 
Prob>F=0.000 
F(31,1478)=3.76 
Prob>F=0.000 
Time specific fixed 
effects 
F(3,761)=1.08 
Prob>F=0.356 
F(4,1396)=6.53 
Prob>F=0.000 
F(3,1478)=1.37 
Prob>F=0.000 
Obs. 818 1456 1545 
R2 0.7639 0.7615 0.252 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively  
 
These results are consistent over time, but only from 1995 onwards, as it is shown in 
Table 4. In the early 1990s, FDI to China was not able to condition FDI flows in other 
recipient countries. As a matter of fact, FDI flows to China show the largest increase 
in the second half of the 1990s.  
Country-specific spillover effects from FDI into China  
As discussed above, it is likely that the impact of FDI into China vary across host 
countries. To uncover country-specific effects, we interact the fitted FDI into China 
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with dummy variables which take the value one for each host country and zero 
otherwise. We first estimate country-specific effects for total FDI and second, we 
distinguish between spillover effects on horizontal and vertical FDI. The results are 
shown in Table 5.    
Consistent with the previous results shown in Table 1, we find that FDI inflows into 
China have been complementary with FDI into the majority of EU15 countries. The 
effect on FDI into Austria is not significantly different from zero. FDI inflows into 
China appear negatively associated with FDI into small countries such as Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and Malta. FDI inflows into China have been 
complementary to FDI into the larger CEE countries, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania. The FDI inflows into China have been not significantly different 
from zero in Slovenia and Slovakia.     
FDI into China has been complementary to horizontal FDI in Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia. It appears that FDI 
into China has diverted market-seeking FDI in the cases of Austria, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom.   
In the case of vertical FDI, FDI into China has been complementary or not 
significantly related to FDI into EU15 countries with the exception of Portugal and 
Spain. Clearly, FDI into China has diverted efficiency-seeking FDI from Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Romania, Slovakia and Cyprus.  
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Table 5:  The impact of FDI into China on FDI in other countries 
 
 FDI Horizontal FDI Vertical FDI 
Ln MPijt 0.406***    (0.045) 0.417***    (0.056) 0.417***    (0.056) 
Abs diff GDP per 
capita i,j 
-0.009         (0.027) -0.201***   (0.045) -0.201***   (0.045) 
INSTjt 0.298           (0.293) 0.065           (0.291) 0.065           (0.291) 
Austria 0.063           (0.108) -0.075***    (0.026) 0.207***     (0.076) 
Belgium  0.431***     (0.051) 0.002            (0.012) 0.040           (0.037) 
Denmark  0.290***     (0.055) -0.003          (0.012) 0.035           (0.031) 
Finland 0.248***     (0.055) -0.006          (0.008) 0.036*        (0.019) 
France 0.488***     (0.038) -0.002          (0.004) 0.062***    (0.011) 
Germany  0.491***     (0.037) 0.002            (0.004) 0.050***    (0.010) 
Greece  0.252***     (0.055) 0.022            (0.029) -0.026        (0.061) 
Ireland 0.526***     (0.034) -0.015**       (0.007) 0.093***   (0.015) 
Italy  0.470***     (0.037) 0.031***      (0.010) -0.028       (0.025) 
Luxembourg  0.441***     (0.057) -0.099***    (0.028) 0.265***  (0.061) 
The Netherlands 0.565***     (0.034) -0.006          (0.004) 0.083***  (0.009) 
Portugal  0.417***     (0.041) 0.064***      (0.018) -0.098**   (0.039) 
Spain 0.495***     (0.035) 0.064***      (0.017) -0.093**   (0.037) 
Sweden  0.459***     (0.043) 0.037***      (0.013) -0.043      (0.032) 
United Kingdom 0.555***     (0.034) -0.011**      (0.005) 0.093***  (0.013) 
Bulgaria -0.191***   (0.068) 0.152 ***    (0.055) -0.336*** (0.114) 
Czech Republic 0.299***     (0.048) 0.056**       (0.023) -0.091*     (0.049) 
Estonia -0.370***    (0.091) 0.172***     (0.054) -0.399*** (0.113) 
Hungary 0.390***     (0.044) -0.012          (0.023) 0.064        (0.047) 
Latvia -0.444***    (0.100) 0.090*          (0.046) -0.233      (0.097) 
Lithuania -0.411***    (0.106) 0.034            (0.056) -0.116      (0.117) 
Poland  0.390***     (0.042) 0.024            (0.017) -0.012      (0.036) 
Romania 0.105*         (0.055) 0.084**       (0.035) -0.162**  (0.070) 
Slovakia 0.100           (0.064) 0.181***     (0.037) -0.374*** (0.076) 
Slovenia -0.111          (0.087) -0.017          (0.062) 0.021         (0.137) 
United States 0.600***     (0.031) 0.031***     (0.008) -0.010       (0.017) 
Switzerland 0.499***     (0.036) 0.008           (0.006) 0.035**    (0.014) 
Russia 0.342***     (0.049) 0.099*         (0.059) -0.168      (0.121) 
Mexico 0.544***     (0.039) 0.059***     (0.022) -0.655      (0.044) 
Malta -0.288***    (0.105) -0.104         (0.103) 0.185        (0.220) 
Japan 0.443***     (0.047) 0.078***     (0.013) -0.124*** (0.029) 
India 0.330***     (0.048)  0.088           (0.145) -0.139       (0.117) 
Cyprus 0.304           (0.193) 0.478*         (0.251) -0.938**   (0.464) 
Brazil  0.576***     (0.037) 0.093***     (0.035) -0.124*     (0.067) 
Home country fixed 
effects 
F(20,4126)=12.23 
Prob>F=0.000 
  
H0: Equal slope 
coefficients across 
countries 
F(33,4126)=16.56 
Prob>F=0.000 
F(33,4092)=7.01 
Prob>F=0.000 
F(33,4092)=8.11 
Prob>F=0.000 
Time specific fixed 
effects 
F(13,4126)=8.26 
Prob>F=0.000 
F(13,4092)=8.45 
Prob>F=0.000 
F(13,4120)=7.81 
Prob>F=0.000 
Obs. 4197 4197 4197 
R2 0.7231 0.7428 0.7428 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively  
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6. Concluding Remarks  
 
In this paper we analyse the effects of FDI into China originating in OECD countries 
on FDI into EU and other countries. In particular, we estimate an augmented gravity 
model using a panel of cross-country annual data over the period 1990-2004. We first  
examine determinants of bilateral FDI flows and the impact of FDI into China on FDI 
into other countries. Second, we investigate whether and to what extent FDI flows 
into China have occurred at the expense of FDI into European Union countries. We 
distinguish between the EU countries prior to the enlargements of 2004 and 2007 
(EU15) and the new EU member states from Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries. Third, we estimate the spillover effects from FDI into China on horizontal 
and vertical FDI into other countries.  Finally, we identify country-specific spillover 
effects from FDI into China.  
Our results suggest that FDI outflows from OECD countries take place mainly among 
countries with similar size and factor endowments, proxied by differences in GDP per 
capita between home and host countries, and with high levels of institutional quality. 
These results are in line with the theory of multinational enterprise and consistent 
with previous empirical studies.  
We provide empirical evidence showing that on average, ceteris paribus, FDI inflows 
into China are complementary to FDI inflows into other countries. However, while 
this complementarity is true for EU15 countries, it appears that FDI inflows into 
China originating in OECD countries have substituted FDI into CEE countries. This 
result suggests that the advantage of these latter countries related to their proximity to 
FDI source countries is not sufficient to offset the attractiveness of China as a FDI 
destination.  
Our results also indicate that this FDI diversion effect on CEE countries has persisted 
and strengthened over the analysed period. The impact of FDI inflows into China on 
FDI into EU15 countries has been positive and significantly different from zero over 
the period 1990-1999 and it has become not significantly different from zero in recent 
years.   
The large FDI into China has encouraged both horizontal and vertical FDI into the 
other countries included in our sample. In the case of EU15, the FDI complementarity 
 21 
has been higher in comparison to non-EU host countries in the case of vertical FDI 
and it has been lower in the case of horizontal FDI. In comparison to other non-EU 
host countries, CEE countries have benefited less from this FDI complementarity.  
Overall, our results indicate that complementarity between FDI into China and FDI 
into other countries has been higher in vertical FDI in comparison to horizontal FDI. 
These results have been more or less constant since 1995 onwards.  
We examined the country-specific spillover effects from FDI into China and found 
that FDI into China have diverted FDI from very small EU economies such as 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta. This FDI diversion appears in the case 
of vertical FDI. We also found evidence on diversion in vertical FDI in other EU 
countries such as Portugal and Spain, but this substitution effect is offset by a strong 
complementarity in horizontal FDI.  
In summary, our research results suggest that FDI inflows into China and FDI inflows 
into the majority of EU countries are complementary. However, it appears that small 
economies such as Bulgaria, the Baltic countries and Malta which compete with 
China for efficiency-seeking FDI have been affected by the surge of FDI inflows into 
China.  To the extent that these countries will catch up, their economic size will 
increase and it is likely that they will attract more market-seeking FDI and less 
efficiency-seeking FDI.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1:  Definitions and Data Sources of Variables 
Variable Definition and source 
FDIijt Aggregate foreign direct investment outflows from source country i to host 
country j at time t. Data come from the OECD International Direct 
Investment Statistics Yearbook 
GDPi(j)t Gross domestic product in USD in country i (j) at time t, constant 2000 
prices. World Bank, World Development indicators. 
GDPCAPi(j)t Per capita gross domestic product in USD in country i (j) at time t, 
constant 2000 prices. World Bank, World Development indicators. 
INSTjt Quality of institutions in country j at time t. The mean value of three 
indicators: “corruption”, “law and order”, and “bureaucracy quality”; the 
index ranges from 0 (lowest ) to 1 (highest)lowest risk). Data source: the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)  
DISTij Great circle distance between home country i and host country j. CEPII 
database 
αi, βj Source and host country dummy variables 
τt Time dummy variables 
FDICNit Aggregate bilateral foreign direct investment outflows from source country 
i to China at time t. Data come from the OECD International Direct 
Investment Statistics Yearbook,  
DISTCNi Great circle distances between source country i and China. CEPII database 
GDPCNt Gross domestic product in USD in China at time t, constant 2000 prices. 
World Bank, World Development indicators. 
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 Table A2:  Determinants of  FDI to China  
(Estimates from first stage IV regression) 
 
Ln MPi,CN,t -4.862***        (0.389) 
Ln |GDPCAPit - GDPCAPCN,t| 7.622***          (0.379) 
Ln MPijt  0.027               (0.017) 
Ln |GDPCAPit - GDPCAPjt| 0.007                (0.009) 
INSTjt -0.046              (0.212) 
Home country fixed effects χ2(18)=740.34 
Prob > χ2= 0.000 
Host country fixed effects χ2(32)=1703.84 
Prob > χ2= 0.000 
Time specific fixed effects χ2(12)=133.26 
Prob > χ2= 0.000 
Obs. 4197 
Centered R2 0.93 
Uncentered R2 0.98 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*** indicates significance at 1%. 
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